

TOP SECRET

4 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Notes on NSC Meeting, 4 February 1954

1. DCI on Indochina

- Referred to Viet Minh drive on Luang Prabang and French reinforcement of area -- should be able to contain Viet Minh drive.
- Referred to Viet Minh force east of Thakhek cutting Seno road -- French force adequate to contain.
- Referred to Pleiku area fighting -- and loss of outposts and blockhouses in Delta.
- Concern over Viet Minh appeal to people -- no drive among Vietnam -- it's a French war.

2. President -- Asked if something couldn't be done with religious angle -- being Buddhists -- to give them fervor.

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Vice President -- Agreed had to do something but warned not to undersell Bao Dai as leader -- presentable, scratch golfer -- but full of French caution and hesitancy.

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- Asked DCI --

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DCI -- yes. Pretty reliable.

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- Asked DCI --

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President -- Find out what natives want -- identify war with that. Referred to Phil experience: "independencia" meaning food -- overtaking politicians who feared economic consequences of independence.

Vice President -- referred to defeatist attitude growing from adverse press reporting of every minor Viet Minh move as smashing offensive -- can't something be done about this -- affecting Congress in re appropriations and aid -- Stennis letter.

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DCI --

Read from CBS AM B/c -- referred to President appointing special NSC committee to report on Indochina War.

President -- How do things like that (committee) get to the press? Are all NSC members getting subordinates together and warning them to keep quiet on NSC discussions -- referred to Pentagon leaks -- three in one morning -- getting so President feeling nervous to talk in NSC.

Return to matter of trying to improve public information on Indochina -- and sending strong team to Indochina. DCI referred to French suspicion handicapping U.S. efforts.

President -- referred to Pleven as close friend -- also Letourneau -- could make direct appeal to him (Pleven) to permit U.S. activities -- as much as he controlled.

3. DCI on Yugoslavia -- recognized stresses on Tito government since death of Stalin. Review of Yugoslav attitudes but no sign of return to Cominform. Djilas affair -- pressure toward more democracy -- "quote" -- feminine intrigue -- ousted from posts -- not physically purged. Result likely to be tightening of discipline in Party. Some suppression of forces pressing for more democracy. Djilas may have thought he could get away with it because he was so close to Tito -- misjudged.

- 3 -

Referred to crop trouble -- likely dependence on U.S.

President -- Won't that make them more amenable?

Smith -- Talk re 400,000 tons of wheat -- Yugoslavia to purchase margin above 300,000 allocation.

Humphrey will welcome that.

Smith -- Popovic talks -- Trieste negotiations -- Thompson for Holmes in London talks -- change of team captains before game -- careful not mention wheat and Trieste in same sentence. Trieste border adjustments possible -- Yugoslavs very sensitive.

Referred to church pressures on situation. Yugoslavs very helpful.

Popovic to be replaced by Yugoslav Ambassador to UN.
Popovic to give Statue to President.

President -- I need another statue like a dog needs another flea.

4. DCI -- Briefly referred to Syrian situation -- threat to Shishekly government -- Druze trouble in Syria -- good fighters but insurgent.

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